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Inside Corporate Finance: The Advisory Side of the Deal · Part 01

A Good Company Is Not Always an Investable Company

Andrea Battista LL.M.6 min readEdition of 2026-09-22

What this chapter covers

Why a profitable, well-run business still has to become investable: a reconciled financial story, capital that fits the plan, governance a third party can rely on, and management able to explain the transaction.

Key takeaways

  • Good performance opens the conversation; investability decides whether it continues.
  • “We need capital to grow” describes an intention, not a funding strategy.
  • Accounts, forecasts and the equity story have to reconcile with one another.
  • Governance and reporting signal how much weight a third party can place on the numbers.
  • Preparation happens before the market is approached, not during the process.

One of the most common misunderstandings in corporate finance is assuming that a good business will automatically be attractive to investors or lenders.

It will not.

A company may have strong products, loyal customers, experienced management and an attractive market position, yet still struggle to raise capital. The reason is simple: investors and lenders do not assess only whether a company is “good”. They assess whether the opportunity presented to them is investable.

That requires something more specific: understandable numbers, a credible use of funds, an appropriate capital structure, clear governance and a realistic path to repayment or return.

The difference between a good company and an investable company is therefore often not the underlying business. It is the way the business is prepared and presented for a transaction.

Good performance is not enough

Consider a profitable manufacturing company generating €25 million of annual revenue. It has been operating for fifteen years, has established customers and wants to raise €8 million to expand production.

On paper, this sounds attractive.

But the first questions from a financing source will immediately go deeper.

How much EBITDA does the company generate? How volatile has it been over the last three years? What debt is already outstanding? How concentrated are the revenues among the largest customers? What exactly will the €8 million finance? When will the new capacity become operational? How much additional cash flow should it generate? And how will the lender ultimately be repaid?

If management cannot answer these questions clearly, the quality of the underlying company may not be enough to obtain financing.

Capital providers need to understand not only where the business is today, but what happens to their money tomorrow.

“We need capital to grow” is not a funding strategy

A recurring weakness in fundraising processes is an imprecise use of funds.

A company may say that it wants €10 million “for growth”, “international expansion” or “working capital”. Those expressions are too broad to support an investment decision.

A credible funding request should normally be broken down.

For example:

€4 million for a new production line, €2 million for inventory required to support the additional capacity, €1.5 million for commercial expansion into two new markets, €1 million for technology and systems, and €1.5 million of liquidity buffer during the ramp-up period.

Now the capital provider can analyse the request.

It can test whether the amount is proportionate, whether the assumptions are reasonable and whether the proposed capital structure fits the intended use.

This distinction matters because different uses of funds often require different forms of capital. A short-term working capital requirement should not necessarily be financed in the same way as a five-year industrial expansion. Acquiring another company creates different funding needs from covering operating losses.

The advisory work therefore starts before approaching the market: the company must first understand exactly what it is financing and why.

The financial story has to reconcile

Investors and lenders quickly lose confidence when the numbers do not tell a consistent story.

A business plan may project rapid growth while historical revenues have been flat. EBITDA may be presented one way in management accounts and another way in the fundraising materials. The company may describe itself as highly cash-generative while consistently increasing short-term borrowing.

None of these points necessarily makes the business unattractive. But they need to be explained.

The financial model, management presentation, historical accounts and funding request should tell the same story.

If EBITDA is being adjusted for exceptional costs, the adjustments should be identifiable and defensible. If growth is expected to accelerate significantly, management should be able to explain what has changed: new contracts, additional capacity, geographic expansion, a new distribution channel or another concrete driver.

A capital provider does not expect every company to be perfect.

It does expect the numbers to be coherent.

The wrong capital can turn a good company into a bad transaction

Being investable also means seeking the right type of capital.

A company may be perfectly healthy but pursue a financing structure that does not fit its cash flows.

For example, a business with limited current profitability but significant future growth potential may struggle to support a large amount of amortising debt. Equity or a more flexible capital structure may be more appropriate.

The opposite can also be true. A mature company with predictable cash flows may not need to sell a substantial equity stake simply because management assumes that equity is the only source of growth capital.

This is why the first advisory question should not be:

“Who can provide the money?”

It should be:

“What capital can this company reasonably support?”

Only then should the search for investors or lenders begin.

Governance matters more than many founders expect

A transaction also exposes the internal organisation of the company.

Who actually makes decisions? Are shareholder relationships clear? Are related-party transactions properly documented? Is the corporate structure unnecessarily complicated? Are key contracts signed and available? Are there unresolved disputes between shareholders? Does management reporting provide reliable information?

These issues often appear secondary to founders who have operated the business successfully for years.

To an external investor or lender, they are part of the risk assessment.

A €50 million company that cannot quickly produce basic corporate documentation may appear less institutional than a smaller business with clean governance, reliable reporting and a well-organised data room.

Preparation therefore affects perception.

And perception affects execution.

Management must be able to explain the transaction

A good adviser can prepare financial materials, organise documentation and structure the funding request.

But management eventually has to defend the opportunity itself.

When meeting a potential investor or lender, the CEO or CFO should be able to explain, in relatively simple terms, what the company does, how it makes money, why it needs capital, what the funding will achieve and what the principal risks are.

Overcomplicated answers can be as damaging as incomplete ones.

If the investment proposition requires forty minutes to explain before the capital provider understands what is actually being financed, the transaction probably needs further preparation.

The best opportunities are often relatively easy to summarise:

This is the business. This is what it earns. This is the capital required. This is what the capital will finance. This is the expected result. This is how the investor earns a return or the lender gets repaid.

That clarity is not superficial. It usually reflects substantial work behind the scenes.

Becoming investable before approaching the market

One of the most expensive mistakes in corporate finance is approaching investors or lenders too early.

Once a financing source has reviewed an opportunity and rejected it because the materials were incomplete, the numbers inconsistent or the structure unrealistic, restarting the conversation later can be difficult.

The better approach is to identify the weaknesses before the market does.

That may mean improving financial reporting, clarifying the use of funds, reducing an unrealistic funding request, resolving a shareholder issue, reorganising the corporate structure or simply preparing a better explanation of the company's performance.

Sometimes this work changes the transaction itself.

A company initially seeking €15 million of equity may discover that €8 million of debt plus a smaller equity component produces a better result. Another may conclude that it should postpone fundraising for six months until a major customer contract is signed and the valuation can be supported more convincingly.

That is part of advisory work: not simply taking a company's initial request to the market, but determining whether the proposed transaction actually makes sense.

A good company is the starting point

Strong fundamentals remain essential. No amount of structuring can turn a fundamentally weak business into a compelling investment proposition.

But good fundamentals alone do not create an executable transaction.

An investable company combines the quality of the underlying business with a funding request that can be understood, analysed and ultimately approved.

The numbers need to reconcile. The use of funds needs to be specific. The capital structure needs to fit the business. Governance needs to withstand scrutiny. Management needs to communicate clearly. And the proposed transaction needs to offer a credible economic outcome for whoever is providing the capital.

That is the difference between saying “this is a good company” and being able to say:

“this is a transaction the market can actually finance.”